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was murder of the first degree, and we cannot say that there 
was any abuse of discretion in imposing the death penalty. 
(See Pen. Code, §§ 189, 190, 1026.) 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
25, 1952. 
[S. F. No. 18333. In Bank. Aug. 27, 1952.] 
JAMES F. THO¥AS, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA 
EMPI..JOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION et 
al., Appellants. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Administrative Procedure-Judi-
cial Review.-The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board is 
a statutory agency with statewide jurisdiction and has no 
constitutional authority to make final determinations of fact, 
and any person deprived of a property right by such an 
administrative body is entitled to a limited trial de novo in 
the superior court. 
[2] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-Unemploy-
ment benefits provided for by the Unemployment Insurance 
Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d) are property rights 
within the rule that persons deprived of property rights by 
a statutory administrative agency are entitled to a limited 
trial de novo in the superior court. 
[3] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Authority of Commission.-
When a claimant has met all requirements of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, and all contingencies have taken place 
under its terms, he then has a statutory right to a fixed or 
definitely ascertainable sum of money, the exact determination 
. of which is essentially a mathematical and mechanical process, 
and the administrative authorities have no discretion to with-
hold benefits from him once it is determined that the facts 
. support his claim and the condition of the fund permits 
payment. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 176, 
233. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Unemployment Insurance, § 34; 
[3] Unemployment Insurance, § 21; [5, 6] Unemployment Insur-
ance,§ 35. 
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[4] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a man-
damus proceeding in the superior court to compel payment 
of unemployment benefits denied by the Unemployment Insur-
ance Appeals Board, the court may properly exercise its inde-
pendent judgment on the evidence. 
[5] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a man-
damus proceeding to compel payment of unemployment bene-
fits denied by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to 
employees of a company's sawmill who refused to go through 
a picket line set up by the logging employees of the company, 
a finding that claimants were discharged as of a certain date 
is sustained by evidence that, after the plant was closed, each 
of the claimants received a notice from the company entitled 
"employment termination," which was signed by the company's 
foreman and stated that the "date terminated" was that par-
ticular date, since their mere refusal to cross the picket line 
-did not terminate the employer-employee relationship. 
[6] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a man-
damus proceeding to compel payment of unemployment bene-
_fits to employees of a company's sawmill who refused to go 
-through a picket line set up by the logging employees of the 
Slompany, a determination of the trial court that the discharge 
of claimants by the company as of a certain date was the 
_direct and proximate cause of each claimant being unemployed 
after that date is not sustained in the absence of evidence 
indicating that the notices terminating employment caused 
claimants to remain out of work after that date or had 
anything to do with their determination to remain away from 
their jobs, and where evidence that they failed to respond 
to subsequent notices given by the company to all employees 
requesting that they return to work immediately or as soon 
as strike conditions cease to exist show that they were out of 
work because of a trade dispute and thus disqualified from 
receiving benefits under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. W. T. Belieu, Judge.* 
Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel payment of unemploy-
ment benefits. Judgment granting writ reversed. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys Gen-
eral, Irving H. Perluss, William L. Shaw and Chas. W. John-
son, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellants California 
Employment Stabilization Commission et al. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Marshall P. Madison, Francis 
N. Marshall and Frederick H. Hawki.ns for Appellant Pacific 
Lumber Company. 
Todd & Todd, Clarence E. Todd, Henry C. Todd, George E. 
Flood and Gordon W. Mallatratt for Respondent. 
GIBSON, 0. J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment which 
granted a writ of mandate ordering benefits to be paid to 
plaintiff and 190 other employees of defendant Pacific Lum-
ber Company under the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats. 
1935, p. 1226, as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws [1937], 
Act 8780d; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws [1944], Act 8780d.) The 
judgment set aside a decision of the California Unemploy-
ment Insurance Appeals Board which denied such benefits 
to the claimants. 
The logging employees of the company struck and set up 
a picket line around the company's sawmill. Claimants, who 
were plant or mill employees, refused to go through the 
picket line. The company closed the plant and gave claim-
ants notices of "employment termination." The appeals 
board determined that claimants were out of work because 
of a trade dispute and therefore were disqualified by sec-
tion 56 of the act from receiving unemployment benefits.* 
This proceeding for a writ of mandate was then instituted 
in the superior court, and the matter was presented on the 
record before the board. The court, after holding that it 
was entitled to exercise independent judgment on the evi-
dence, found that claimants had been discharged and con-
cluded, in effect, that this removed their disqualification. It 
annulled the decision of the board and granted a writ of 
mandate directing the commission to pay benefits accruing 
after the date of discharge. 
Defendants contend that the trial court was without power 
to reweigh the evidence and that, in any event, the judgment 
must be reversed because the undisputed facts show as a 
matter of law that claimants are disqualified under section 
56 of the Unemployment Insurance .Act. 
*Section 56, as amended in 1945 (Stats. 1945, p. 2225), provides: "An 
individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment, and no such 
benefit shall be payable to him under any of the following conditions: 
(a) If he left his work because of a trade dispute and for the period 
during which he continues out of work by reason of the fact that the 
trade dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which 
he was employed." 
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[1] The appeals board is a statutory agency with state-
wide jurisdiction, and it does not have constitutional authority 
to make final determinations of fact. (For general statu-
tory provisions see Unemp. Ins. Act, Deering's Gen. Laws 
[1944], .Act 8780d, §§ 1, 77, et seq.) .Any person deprived 
of a property right by such an administrative body is en-
titled to a limited trial de novo in the superior court. (Laisne 
v. State Board of Optornetry, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457] ; 
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301 [196 
P.2d 20] ; Dare v. Board of JJ!edical Exarniners, 21 Cal.2d 
790 [136 P.2d 304] .) [2] In our opinion the benefits pro-
vided for by the Unemployment Insurance .Act are property 
rights within the meaning of the term as used in the cases 
requiring a trial de novo. [3] When a claimant has met 
all requirements of the act, and all contingencies have taken 
place under its terms, he then has a statutory right to a 
fixed or definitely ascertainable sum of money. (See, for 
example, § § 54, 67 [now in 68], and 72 as amended in 1945, 
Stats. 1945, pp. 1108, 2558, 2559-2560.) The determination 
of the exact amounts due is essentially a mathematical and 
mechanical process, and the administrative authorities have 
no discretion to withhold benefits from any particular claim-
ant once it is determined that the facts support his claim 
and the condition of the fund permits payment. Benefit 
claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for 
business and professional licenses such as those considered 
in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [91 P.2d 
1035], and Southern Cal. Jockey Olttb v. California Racing 
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [223 P.2d 1], where we held 
that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property 
rights. There, as the court pointed out, the administrative 
officers were given broad discretionary powers to deny ap-
plications, subject to review only for disregard of the law, 
arbitrary action, or other abuse of discretion. [ 4] We con-
clude, therefore, that in the present case the trial court acted 
correctly in exercising its independent judgment on the 
evidence. 
[5] The next question is whether the evidence is suffi-
cient to support the determination of the trial court that 
the claimants are entitled to receive unemployment insur-
ance benefits. They refused to cross the picket line which 
was set up by the logging workers on January 14, 1946, 
and the company closed its plant on January 18 because 
of the absence of certain unidentified "key men" neces-
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sary to the operation of the mill. Some of the claimants 
participated in the picket line both before and after the 
plant was closed. It is undisputed that claimants' refusal 
to cross the picket line resulted in their being out of work 
because of a trade dispute, within the meaning of section 56 
of the act, s1rpra, ( Stats. 1945, p. 2225), from January 14 
to and including January 17, and, therefore, that they were 
disqualified from receiving benefits for this period. (See 
Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 
695 [151 P.2d 202], and companion cases.) 
After the plant was closed each of the claimants received 
from the company a notice entitled "employment termina-
tion," which was signed by the company's foreman and 
stated that the ''date terminated'' was January 18, 1946. 
The trial court found and concluded that these notices were 
used by the company for the purpose of discharging claim-
ants, that the company terminated and discharged each claim-
ant on January 18, 1946, and that the discharge was the 
direct and proximate cause of unemployment after that date. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's :find-
ing that claimants were discharged as of January 18. They 
were employees of the company until that date, since their 
refusal to cross the picket line did not terminate the employer-
employee relationship. (See Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California 
Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154 
A.IJ.R. 1081].) The "employment termination" notices were 
unqualified and indicated that there was a discharge as of 
the designated date, and there is other evidence, which need 
not be set forth here, that tends to support the :finding. 
Testimony, relied upon by defendants, that the company 
did not intend to discharge claimants but only to terminate 
their "continuous employment period" for purposes of the 
company's bonus plan merely presented a conflict in the 
evidence which was resolved in favor of claimants. 
[6] A more difficult question is presented as to whether 
there is any substantial evidence which supports the deter-
mination of the trial court that the discharge of claimants 
by the company was the direct and proximate cause of each 
claimant being unemployed after January 18, 1946. There 
appears to be no conflict in the evidence with respect to the 
events which transpired insofar as this phase of the case 
is concerned. Claimants refused to pass the picket line which 
the logging employees established around the company's saw-
mill, and, as we have seen, it is undisputed that this refusal 
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operated to disqualify claimants from receiving benefits for 
the period of their unemployment prior to January 18. The 
picket line, as well as the trade dispute between the logging 
employees and the company, continued after that date and 
during the entire period for which claimants seek benefits. 
Four of the six claimants who testified in the administrative 
proceeding admitted that they participated in the picket 
line after they were discharged. 
There is no evidence in the record indicating that the 
termination notices caused claimants to remain out of work 
after January 18 or had anything to do with their deter-
mination to remain away from their jobs. None of the 
claimants who appeared as witnesses testified that he would 
have returned to work if he had not been discharged or that 
he would have been willing to cross the picket line. To the 
contrary, claimants did not respond to two notices given by 
the company to all employees on or about January 21 and 
February 18 requesting that they return to work immediately 
or as soon as strike conditions cease to exist. 
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this 
case the only reasonable conclusion is that claimants re-
mained out of work after January 18 as well as before that 
date because they were unwilling to cross the picket line· 
which was maintained by the logging employees in their 
trade ·dispute with the company. .Accordingly, claimants 
were disqualified under section 56 of the act from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. 
It is undisputed that claimants left their work because 
of a trade dispute within the meaning of section 56(a) of 
the Unemployment Insurance .Act. (See Matson Terminals, 
Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151 
P.2d 202]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 
Cal.2d 321, 328 [109 P.2d 935] .) The only question pre-
sented, therefore, is whether or not they remained out of 
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute was still 
in active progress in the establishment in which they were 
employed. For the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion 
in Southern California Jockey Club v. California Racing 
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 178 [223 P.2d 1], and the dissenting 
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opinions cited therein, it is my opinion that claimants were 
not entitled to a limited trial de novo on this issue; whether 
or not the right to unemployment insurance benefits is a 
property right. Accordingly, the only issue properly before 
the trial court and now before this court is whether the 
findings of the appeals board are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
In Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 
744 [151 P.2d 229, 154 A.L.R. 1081], this court said re-
garding the tests for determining the duration of the dis-
qualification under section 56 (a), when the original unem-
ployment had been superseded by new employment: ''A claim-
ant is thus ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the 
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a claimant 
who leaves his work because of a trade dispute subsequently 
obtains a permanent full-time job, however, he is no longer 
out of work and the continuity of his unemployment is broken. 
If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated to the dispute, 
he is unemployed by reason, not of the trade dispute, but 
of the loss of the new employment [citations]. The trade 
dispute that caused him to leave his original employment is 
not the cause of his subsequent unemployment, and he would 
no more be disqualified from receiving benefits for such un-
employment than if he had not been previously employed 
in the struck establishment. 
''The termination of a claimant's disqualification by sub-
sequent employment thus depends on whether it breaks the 
continuity of the claimant's unemployment and the causal 
connection between his unemployment and the trade dis-
pute." 
In the present case the appeals board was of the opinion 
that an unequivocal discharge would also break the causal 
connection between the unemployment and the trade dis-
pute. It found, however, that by issuing the employment 
termination notices the employer did not unequivocally term-
inate the employment relationship. 
There is evidence that the employer customarily used the 
employment termination notices not only when an employee 
resigned or was discharged, but for the purpose of terminat-
ing an employee's continuous service record under the "Con-
tinuous Service Compensation Plan" when he was absent 
without leave for more than three days. Accordingly, the 
purpose for which the notices were used in the present case 
cannot be determined from their provisions alone. 
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During the period the employer issued the termination 
notices it also sent to all employees and former employees 
the following notice : 
''All Employees and former Employees not working be-
cause of the strike or strike conditions are requested and 
urged to return to work immediately or as soon as such 
conditions cease to exist. 
''Failure to comply with this request may result in other 
persons being employed in your place." 
It may reasonably be inferred that the employer was not 
discharging employees it was urging to return to work, and 
that the termination notices were therefore neither intended 
to sever nor understood by claimants as severing the employer-
employee relationship. Moreover, the notice urging the em-
ployees to return to work itself indicated that they would re-
tain their status until other persons were employed in their 
place. 
Since the determination of the appeals board was sup-
ported by substantial evidence, I concur in the reversal of 
the judgment. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that 
the claimants were out of work because of a discharge by 
the employer rather than a trade dispute. 
After January 17, 1946, is the crucial period, for the em-
ployer closed the plant. After the plant was closed each 
of the claimants received from the company a notice which 
was in form as follows: 
"THE PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY FORM 2105 
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION 
The employee must present this slip to the Employment 
Office at Scotia within two days from date of issue. 
Employee No. ___ B ___ _ 
Working Occupation, _________ _ 
Rate Date Last Worked No. hour"----
Date Terminate·"------------------
Signe;u_ ________ Note•U----------
Foreman Timekeeper 
Employee's Signature _______________ , 
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The forms, signed by the company's foreman, were ap-
propriately filled out with respect to each claimant, the 
"date terminated" being stated as January 18, 1946. The 
trial court found and concluded that the claimants were 
given the termination notices because they refused to go 
through the picket line; that the notices were used in this 
case for the purpose of terminating claimants' employment 
and amounted to an unequivocal discharge; and that this 
discharge interposed a new intervening cause for claimants' 
unemployment, relieving them after January 18, 1946, from 
any disqualification imposed by section 56 of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act. 
It is conceded that the evidence is sufficient to support the 
trial court's finding that claimants were unequivocally dis-
charged as of January 18th, and that they were employees 
of the company until that date, since their refusal to cross 
the picket line did not terminate the employer-employee re-
lationship. (See Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 
24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154 .A..L.R. 1081] .) 
This is clear for the "employment termination" notices were 
unqualified and plainly indicated that there was a discharge 
as of the designated date. One claimant who refused to 
cross the picket line was told by his immediate supervisor 
that he was ''through,'' that after the strike was over he 
would have no job, and that the supervisor would see to 
it that the claimant would not receive "compensation." 
Claimants were given their 1946 federal withholding tax 
statements, which, under the Internal Revenue Code, need 
not have been furnished until termination of employment 
or until January 31st of the succeeding year. (26 U.S.C . .A.. 
§ 1625 [a].) Defendants rely on testimony that the com-
pany did not intend to discharg·e claimants but only to ter-
minate their ''continuous employment period'' for purposes 
of the company's bonus plan. .A.s the court found, however, 
no such limited purpose was indicated on any of the notices, 
and the testimony merely presented a conflict in the evidence 
which was resolved in favor of claimants. 
The majority opinion holds, however, that the discharge 
was not the proximate cause of the unemployment after 
January 18th, contrary to the trial court's finding. With 
that I disagree. The record supports the determination of 
the trial court that the discharge of claimants on January 
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18, 1946, interposed a new, intervening cause for their un-
employment. The fact that claimants were unemployed be-
cause of a trade dispute from January 14th through January 
17th did not preclude them from becoming entitled to bene-
fits after that date if continuation of their unemployment 
was due to factors other than their participation in the trade 
dispute. The disqualification exists only during the period 
in which the dispute remains the cause of the unemploy-
ment. (Section 56 of the act; see Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia Emp. Corn., 24 Cal.2d 744, 748-750 [151 P.2d 229, 
154 A.L.R. 1081] .) 
'l'he company's act of discharging claimants completely 
changed the nature of their unemployment, insofar as their 
status under section 56 is concerned. Disqualification under 
this statute depends upon the fact of voluntary action by 
the worker. (See Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Emp. 
Corn., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151 P.2d 202] ; Bodinson Mfg. 
Co. v. California Ernp. Corn., 17 Cal.2d 321, 327-328 [109 
P.2d 935] ; see, also, McKinley v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 
34 Cal.2d 239, 242-245, 252 [209 P.2d 602].) An employee 
who observes a picket line is disqualified on the theory that 
he has a free ''choice'' in determining whether to work in 
a plant in which certain of his fellow employees are on strike, 
and that his decision not to work is voluntary. (Bodinson 
Mfg. Co. v. California Ernp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 327-328 
[109 P.2d 935] ; Matson Terminals Inc. v. California Ernp. 
Com., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151 P.2d 202] .) He neverthe-
less remains an employee, regardless of the strike and pic-
keting (see Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 
24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154 A.L.R. 1081] ), 
and he can return to work at any time he becomes willing 
to do so. Where, as here, however, the employer discharges 
some of its employees, such persons no longer have the choice 
of returning to their jobs, and it cannot be said that their 
subsequent unemployment is due to their voluntarily con-
tinuing out of work because of a picket line. Unlike per-
sons who remain employees, they have no reasonable expecta-
tion of going back to work upon termination of the trade 
dispute, and if they do obtain work with the same employer, 
they will have to be rehired and will come in as new em-
ployees. It thus seems apparent that section 56 ceases to 
operate with respect to workers whose employment relation-
ship has been wholly severed, and it can have no bearing on 
Aug. 1952] THOMAS v. CALIFORNIA EMP. STAB. CoM. 511 
[39 C.2d 501; 247 P.2d 561] 
their right to benefits until they are reemployed, upon mutual 
agreement. 
Defendants contend that two notices given by the com-
pany show that claimants voluntarily remained away from 
their jobs because of the trade dispute. One notice, dated 
January 21, 1946, requested "all Employees and former Em-
ployees not working because of the strike" to return to work 
immediately or as soon as strike conditions ceased to exist. 
stated that "you are still employees of the Company" and 
repeated the request to return to work. These requests, how-
The second notice, given about a month after the discharge, 
ever, did not alter the fact that claimants were discharged 
nor did they serve to restore the employment relationship, 
and, as we have seen, if anyone had returned to work in 
response to the requests, he would have done so as a new 
employee. 
Unlike the situation presented in McKinley v. California 
Emp. Com., 34 Cal.2d 239 [209 P.2d 602), relied upon by 
defendants, the record does not establish that claimants en-
gaged in any conduct which they knew would cause the com-
pany to retaliate by preventing their return to work. The 
court impliedly found, and the finding is based upon sub-
stantial evidence, that claimants did not know that refusal 
to cross the picket line would result in their discharge. Such 
conduct ordinarily suspends but does not terminate the em-
ployment relationship, and the company gave no warning 
that claimants would be discharged. The company had 
adopted a rule which provided that an employee who was 
absent for over three days without permission "shall be 
dropped from the Company's payroll and employment period 
terminated,'' but the rule was contained in a printed book-
let entitled "Continuous Service Compensation Plan" and 
may reasonably be interpreted as pertaining only to that 
plan. 
Further, it does not appear that claimants' conduct caused 
the plant to be closed on January 18, 1946, or to remain 
closed thereafter. The record supports the :finding that the 
plant was closed by the absence of certain key men necessary 
to the operation of said mill, but does not establish that 
claimants were the key men. Even if we assume that the 
strike caused the absence of the key men, claimants were 
not members of the same local union to which the strikers 
belonged, and there is nothing to show that claimants voted 
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for or authorized the strike or that the key men were absent 
because some of the claimants participated in the picketing. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
25, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[S. 1!,. No. 18590. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1952.] 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, 
v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and 
GLENN W. DAHLER, a Minor, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to 
Employment.-In determining whether a particul'ar act is 
reasonably contemplated by the employment so that injuries 
received while performing it may be compensable, the nature 
of the employment, the custom and usage of a particular 
employment, the terms of the contract of employment, and 
other factors should be considered, and any reasonable doubt 
as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in 
view of the policy of liberal construction in favor of the 
employee, should be resolved in his favor. 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-A 
college student employed by operator of store and restaurant 
at a summer resort as a dishwasher and a helper is not en-
titled to compensation for injuries sustained while diving and 
swimming for his own pleasure in a stream off his employer's 
property, although on the resort premises, since in the ab-
sence of evidence that, at the time of such student's hiring, 
anything was said about his participation in any available 
recreational activities or even mention made of the stream, 
it cannot be said that the injuries were sustained in the 
course of or incidental to his employment, or that they were 
proximately caused by the employment. 
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-To en-
title an injured employee to compensation there must be some 
connection between the injury and the employment other 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 83. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 72; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 73, 74; [3] Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 71; [ 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 73. 
